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REPAYING HISTORICAL DEBTS:
THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION
I.
INTRODUCTION

The fate of the Indian population has been one of the neglected
themes of American history. Historians sympathetic with the expansion across the continent of the growing white population have
minimized the fact that one concomitant of this process was the
often ruthless conquering of the numerous aboriginal societies who
had populated virtually the entire area of the United States when
the Europeans arrived. The continent was not "empty" when the
European-Americans persevered in their expansionist and land hungry drives westward. To study the records of these Indian-white
relations is to discover a history of conquest and ill-treatment
which would not be acceptable under any rules of "civilized" warfare, even at that time. These encounters were not merely between
independent groups of whites or colonies and Indian societies, but
they were encouraged and increasingly directed by the developing
United States Government. Though there are exceptions to this
pattern, the theme which emerges is one where Indian groups
were treated as bothersome, but sufficiently weak, obstacles whose
way of life could be repeatedly upset as they were moved from
one area to another. Treaties guaranteeing tracts of land "in perpetuity" to displaced Indian groups were broken as soon as the
government discovered some need for the awarded area. Other
treaty provisions for food, medicine, tools, annuities and other supplies to assist destitute and disintegrated Indian societies to rebuild
were ignored as often as not. It is perhaps a reflection of growing
Indian activism, combined with the awareness brought by the civil
rights movement of unresolved social conflict in the United States,
that these realities of American history are now being explained
in scholarship, that the American population is beginning to see
the visibly impoverished and disoriented condition of large portions
of Indian society as related to the history they have known as
Americans, and the government is looking for new ways to improve
conditions for Indians and to rectify historical wrongs.
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This note will address itself to the government's attempt finally
to come to terms with historical injustices. One of the lesser known
components of the government's recent policy toward Indians is
embodied in the Indian Claims Commission, a structure established
in 1946 with the explicit purpose of disposing of all pre-existing
Indian claims against the government. The focus there will be
on this Commission, with the purpose of studying how the government dealt with the question of what constitutes just redress to the
aggrieved parties. Specifically, attention will be directed toward
the ways in which this moral element was continually given secondary importance to issues of expediency, convenience and rational
bureaucratic concerns, as a result of which, the potential for awarding just compensation in terms of what would have been appropriate
to the claims was not realized.
The structure of this analysis is based on the historical development of the claims policy and on the problems in implementation,
which reveal in the ways they were solved, the above-mentioned
priorities. The reasons which motivated the government to take
up the task of creating an Indian claims policy, and the priorities
given these reasons will be discussed from a historical perspective.
Provisions of the resultant Act will be described in the context
of comparing them with alternatives considered in the course of
the decision making process. This will reveal conflicting conceptualizations of the proposed structure that relate to how the Commission
was dealing with the question of just redress and that have continued to be debated throughout the Commission's life. In addition,
the solutions reached to the problems of Commission structure
and certain procedural issues, particularly from the standpoint of
their implications for the way the Commission perceived Indian
claims and defined just redress, will be presented. From the perspective of the claims themselves, the limitations to just redress,
which resulted from the process of filing claims and from the
decisions reached by the Commission, will be shown.
II
IMPETUS FOR A NEW CLAIMS POLICY
The first response to the recognized need for some governmental
structure to have jurisdiction to hear Indian claims was the establishment of the Court of Claims in 1855. However, in 1863, because
of support by some Indian tribes for the Confederacy," Indians
were barred from presenting claims unless they could obtain special
1.
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MCNICKLE, INDIANS AND OTHER AMERICANS; Two WAYS OF LiFE MEET

NoTE
enabling legislation from Congress. Since Indians were not citizens
at that time, 2 such action was not objected to on constitutional
grounds. However, growing governmental dissatisfaction with this
cumbersome procedure prompted the search for an alternative.
The Meriam Commission reports of 1928 recommended the establishment of a special commission for this purpose, and the first
bill to establish such a structure was introduced into Congress
in 1930.4 This impetus culminated in passage of the Indian Claims
Commission Act on August 13, 1946.1 The Indian Claims Commission was to have a ten year existence during the first five of
which "any Indian tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians residing within the territorial limits of the United
States or Alaska" 8 could present claims. After August 13, 1951,
no further Indian claim originating before the date of the Act
was ever to be brought before the government. The processing
of the three hundred seventy claims, which were divided by causes
of action into six hundred five dockets, sixty-two per cent of which
were not filed until the last six weeks of this five-year periodJ
could not be completed within the statutory time limit. The Act
was extended in 1955, 1960, and 1965 and a bill for a further
extension until 1977 is now before Congress.
Congress took an interest in changing the procedure for processing Indian claims for three main reasons. First, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the existing procedures, both in Congress
and out. Secondly, Congress felt that awards to Indian tribes would
provide some of the resources necessary to implement current
government policy in Indian affairs. Lastly, Congress was aware
that a moral wrong remained to be righted. It is to be noted
that here in these first efforts to facilitate claims processing the
most important concerns of Congress were government-oriented
rather than Indian-oriented, in the sense that even though it was
recognized that this policy would deal with long neglected injustices,
the hearings and debates never centered on creating a p6licy which
would be most effective first and foremost in redressing these
injustices, which to the Indians formed the heart of the matter.
In terms of the purpose of this note, however, the emphasis will
Citizenship to all Indians was awarded in 1924.
2.
3. L. MERIAM, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 48 (1928).
4. H.R. 7963, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1930).
5. Indian Claims Commission Act § 1, ch. 959, § 1, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946), as amended,
25 U.S.C. § 70 (Supp. III, 1964). The text of the Act, amended as of April 10, 1967, is
given in Appendix I.
6. Id. at § 70 a.
7. Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1960, of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1079 (1952). [hereinafter cited as Hearings for appropriate year.]
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be evaluating the manner and extent to which this policy did
fulfill the moral obligation.
In the first instance, the dissatisfaction with existing procedures
was expressed to Congress largely by the Departments of Interior
and Justice, through reports and bills proposing changes. They
were the first formally to sponsor Meriam's idea that the new
structure should be a commission, though as early as 1913, this
idea was expressed before the House Committee on Indian Affairs
by Commissioner on Indian Affairs Meritt.
The work in 1930 of the subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs to investigate the prosecution of Indian claims
brought the defects of the system into full view. 8 Requiring potential
Indian claimants to obtain jurisdictional legislation was inefficient,
time-consuming and costly to the Indians, Congress and the Departments involved. With this piecemeal approach, it was feared that
perhaps a century or more would pass before all claims were
heard. Political considerations, such as the standing in Congress
of the bill's sponsor, the make-up of the Indian committees and
the attitude of the current administration, were often more important
than the merits of the cases in determining whether or not the
enabling legislation would be passed. Some tribes unfamiliar with
the necessary procedures were at the mercy of opportunistic lawyers who expended tribal resources and used political methods
to obtain jurisdictional acts for claims without merit, which were
subsequently dismissed by the Court of Claims." Before a petition
was heard by Congressional committee, it was sent to the Department of the Interior for a report. The Department objected to this
procedure, feeling a conflict in its responsibility to promote the
Indians' interests on the one hand and in having to consider petitions
often charging the Department with irregularities in its dealings
with the tribes on the other. Such conflicts aside, however, the
Department's recommendations also often reflected the attitudes
of the current administration. Inconsistencies were common in the
decisions by Congress to favor or reject petitions and in the provisions included in bills passed, not only from claim to claim
but in the outcome of a given petition on two separate filings.
Congress was pressured by the growing number of petitions
for jurisdictional acts and unable to study each case adequately.
As one result, the provisions in the act passed were often inappropriate to the particular claim; when the Court of Claims dismissed
8.
Hearings on H.R. 7837 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 29 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 7837]. Much of the information in

this section comes from a statement by Rufus G. Poole, Assistant Solicitor, Department
of the Interior at 16-31.
9. Id. at 17.
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cases for want of jurisdiction, Indians were poorer and older but
very little closer to settlement than when they filed their original
petition. They could only continue by returning to pressure Congress
further by requesting amendments to their original act. The settlement of many Indian claims required political decisions in the
form of judging the provisions of a given treaty, and only in
the rare cases where Congress had enabled the court to revise
a treaty could the court prosecute such claims. Although these
claims often had merit and the treaties, if considered as contracts
in an equity court would have been subject to reformulation, Congress was reluctant to grant broad jurisdiction, partly because
it did not have time to obtain adequate knowledge of the cases.
Few complaints were lodged against the work of the Court
of Claims itself; the length of time required for cases to be decided
was not the result of court delays. Rather, it came from the
provision that every Indian claimant before the court was entitled
to a full-scale investigation by the government covering the facts
of the case, defenses against it and set-offs against the claim.
For claims dismissed on the facts, the years of time and thousands
of dollars spent on the cases was an obvious waste.
A final aggravation with this procedure concerned the issue
of setoffs, counterclaims and gratuities which could be charged
against a recovery. Provisions of which government expenditures
were to be charged to the tribe were inconsistent from case to
case both in the jurisdictional acts and in the Court of Claims
decisions. As the number of claims grew, the requirements became
increasingly severe, in part, it seemed, to hold down the cost
of claims payments made. In some cases they completely eliminated
the recovery. Because, however, the amount of the setoff payment
could not be known until the end of the proceedings and because
of the possibility of returning to Congress for an amendment to
the jurisdictional act provisions concerning set-offs if the sum proved
high, the situation did not deter Indians from the expensive process
of pressing their claims.
A second reason for Congressional interest in claims was related
to the use of award funds which would be received by the tribes,
an issue with which the Commission itself was never to be directly
involved. Although decisions regarding the use of Commission-awarded funds were the responsibility of the tribes, Congressmen and
other government officials were aware of the potential implications
of placing a large amount of money in the hands of the Indians
and attempted to influence its use. Eventually the Bureau of Indian
Affairs was able to require tribes to prepare programs for the
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use of these funds before they were disbursed and to participate
in their preparation. 10 Officials themselves differed as to the optimum use of funds, but they realized that through this erasing
of an historical wrong advances could be made toward the solution
of certain contemporary problems. One common threat running
through the particular suggestions made was that these funds could
lessen the degree of government involvement in Indian affairs,
positively stated as increasing the degree of Indian economic independence. According to one report, settling claims would reduce
federal expenditures for the Bureau of Indian Affairs by 50 per
cent,'1 an opinion which has long since proved to be invalid.
Two methods of award fund dispersal were seen by government
officials as helping to achieve government disengagement. In the
first place, the claims, settlement per se would increase Indian
migration to urban areas, erroneously equated with integration,
because some Indians hesitated to leave their reservations for fear
of being excluded from a claims award. 1 2 Award funds, in addition,
would facilitate the move to the city for those interested. As Lurie
has written however:
Ideally, claims payments would give Indian people the necessary stake to begin a new life as ordinary citizens far from
the reservations. In actual fact, the amounts paid were relatively small on a per capita basis and Indian communities
persisted.18
Many per capita payments were too small to provide more than
short-run economic gains. The per capita distribution of the Commission award to the Indians of California, for example, was about
six hundred dollars and, in order to use this money, the poorest
Indians were required to go off welfare.1 4 The award thus was
exhausted by providing funds for subsistence expenditures for a
short time, after which the Indians again became welfare recipients.
Secondly, it was felt that tribes should create long-range development schemes for their reservations, to be financed as far as
possible by award monies. The government's financial burden would
thereby be eased, first, because it would not have to supply funds
10.
Witt, Nationalist Trends Among Amekcan Indians, in THE AMERICAN INDIAN ToDAY 108 (L. Stuart & N. Lurie ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as NATIONALISTIC TRENDS].
11. UNITED STATES CODE CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE-LAWS OF THE 79TH CONGRESS, 2nd

Sess., (Jan. 14, 1946-Aug. 2, 194,6)

1354 (1946).

[hereinafter referred to as 79TH CON-

ORESS].

12. WORKSHOP ON AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS, FEDERAL INDIAN LEGISLATION AND POLIciEs--A STUDY PACKET 125 (1956) ; 79TH CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 1351.
13.

Laurie, Historical Background in THE AMERICAN INDIAN TODAY 81 (L.

Stuart & N.

Lurie ed. 1968).
14. Collier, The Red Man's Burden Ramparts (Feb. 1970), as reprinted in 2:1 AKWEsASNE NOTES 36 (Jan.-Feb., 1970).
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to finance the schemes it was encouraging and, secondly, in the
long run successful development programs would provide a continuing source of income enabling tribes to provide by themselves
the goods and services formerly in the Bureau's budget. One success story in this regard concerns the six hundred Mountain Utes
who received an award of $7,200,000 in 1950, about the time that
oil and natural gas were discovered on their reservation. The development program, devised by the Utes and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, allowed cash grants to individual tribesmen to alleviate
current poverty and established programs for public health, improvement of land and water resources and education. 15
This attitude that tribal economic independence provided an
adequate foundation for tribal autonomy and government withdrawal
was to blossom in 1954 into the policy of termination. Though
the Indian Claims Commission Act bears resemblance to policies
of the period when John Collier was Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
and although it is an overstatement to say that the Act was passed
"so as to expedite termination, 1 6 one effect of the Commission
was to provide the tribes with funds which could aid them in
becoming self-sufficient and in this sense was consistent with termination objectives. Among the errors of the termination policy was
the idea that the apparent economic independence of a reservation
was a sufficient criterion for terminating federal government responsibility. Even if such were the case, the experience of disbursing
Commission-awarded funds has shown the difficulty of implementing
a policy of encouraging economic independence. Factors such as
the population and wealth of a tribe, the reservation's natural resources and the amount of the Commission's award limited the
scope of any plan. Because decisions about the use of award funds
had to be approved by tribal membership, Indian opinions were
another important constraint. Government influence was determined
by the ability of the Bureau to convince tribal leadership and
members of its preferences. Tribal leadership often disagreed with
the membership over the issue of per capita payments versus
a lump sum use of the awards. 7 Individual Indians typically favored
the former, so as to improve their personal standards of living.
Insofar as these funds would be used to take Indians from the
reservation, government officials advocating Indian integration favored such an alternative. Tribal leaders and others seeing per
capita payments as economically non-productive preferred to use
funds for schemes which would benefit the tribe as a whole over
15.

W.

16.
17.

Id. at 167.
Witt. NATIONALISTIC TRENDS, aupra note 10, at 108.

HAGAN,

AMERICAN

INDIANS

167-68 (1961).
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the long run, an attitude supported by government advocates of
termination. A complete evaluation of the benefits which did accrue
to the tribes from Claims Commission-awarded funds will have
to wait until the Commission completes its work. It can be said,
however, that the government is now more cognizant of the difficulties in eliminating Indian poverty, creating economic self-sufficiency and removing government responsibilities and has repudiated its termination policy. 18 Claims awards can at best only provide
some economic assistance toward a goal which requires more than
mere economic change among Indians.
Thirdly, in creating an Indian claims policy, Congress saw
itself as righting a moral wrong in two respects. In the first
place, in establishing some kind of machinery for hearing Indian
claims, it removed the discrimination Indians had suffered by being
barred from obtaining due process in the courts, a condition which
had been unconstitutional since Indians obtained citizenship in 1924.
It might be said that in having a special Commission for the hearing
of their claims alone, the Indians were actually being given preferential treatment representing a reverse discrimination. A special
structure was necessary, however, in order not to burden the Court
of Claims with a backlog of claims which, because of their similarities, could most efficiently be disposed of by a special temporary
structure. All claims accruing after the passage of the Act were
to be dealt with in the same manner as claims by all other citizens.
In the second respect, Congress intended the policy it would
create would eliminate a moral wrong by hearing all outstanding
claims, not only those with bases in law or equity but those of
a moral nature. "In order to settle finally any and all legal,
equitable and moral obligations that the United States might owe
to the Indians, Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission
Act. . . ."1 For this purpose Congress specifically included in
the Act provisions allowing for such claims. "The basis for
presenting a claim under this [special provision] might be considered a 'moral' basis. For under the wording of the law, it
is not necessary that the claim be one which either a court of
equity or law would consider. ' 20 Shortcomings in this regard of
the policy as implemented concern not only the failure of this
special provision which Congress did include to be fully used. They
18. 116 CONo. REC. 23131 (daily ed., July 8, 1970 ) (The American Indians-Message
from the President of the United States). A full study of the termination of the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin is given by Gary Orfield in A STUDY OF THE TERMINATION POLICY
(Denver: Natl. Cong. of Amer. Indians, n.d.) [hereinafter referred to as TERMINATION].
19. I.C.C. ANN. REP. 1 (1969).
20. Selander, Section 2 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 15 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
416-17 (1947).
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relate also to other areas such as the nature and amount of compensation and the way claims were construed, seen in terms of
the procedure by which they were decided. Some of these shortcomings could have been averted, as will be shown, had Congress
directed its efforts more specifically at this factor motivating its
creation of a claims policy.
III

EVOLUTION IN POLICY OUTPUTS
Thus motivated, Congress worked to improve the Indian claims
processing situation. During the early discussions in the Indian
committees, the commission was envisioned as being an "agency
of Congress"21 to aid in processing jurisdictional acts. The claims
cases themselves would continue to be heard by the Court of
Claims. By 1946 when the Act was passed, however, the scope
of the Commission's jurisdiction had been widened and its functions
altered. In order to illustrate the evolution in the nature of the
proposed commission-and also describe some of the important
characteristics of the Act-a comparison will be made of the provisions of a proposed Act, which passed the Senate in 1935 with
the actual version. In this way parts of the policy-making process
can be analyzed by looking at two proposed statutes embodying
sets of choices among alternative means suggested as solutions
to the problems which motivated the policy-formation. The resultant
Act was the document through which Congress communicated to
those in the structure it was creating the particular ways it was
to function and areas in which discretion was to rest with the
Commission, thus setting the stage for what was to follow. Later
the focus will be on implications of the Act's specifications, the
Commission's use of the discretion allowed it, the recurrence of
some of the same issues as were debated prior to the Act-partly
because of ambiguous provisions contained within-and the effectiveness of the policy in accomplishing the goals which motivated
its passage.
The scope of the two bills is similar in terms of the types
of claims which were to be brought before the proposed commissions, though the wording of Section 2 describing the types underwent minor variation. This reflects continuing agreement in government that the commission formed was to dispose of all outstanding
21. Hearings on H.R. 7837 supra note 8, at 7.
22. S. 2731, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), Introduced Into the House of Representatives
as H.R. 7837, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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claims with finality. 2 Thus though S.2731 states that the Commission
shall "investigate all claims" 24 and the Act says "[t]he Commission shall hear and determine the following claims, 2 5 the subsequent clauses in both bills provide for the same range of claims.
The authority delegated by Congress to the Commission was
much broader than was envisioned in 1935. Thus S.2731 says:
It shall be the duty of the Commission to investigate all
claims against the United States . . . and to ascertain and
determine all of the facts relating thereto and all questions
of mixed law and fact as may be incidental to such determination and, on the basis of the facts found by it, to ascertain and determine the merits of26 all such claims and make
findings with reference thereto.
According to the 1946 Act, "The Commission shall hear and determine the following claims. .... ,,27
Likewise, the outputs of the two commissions had different
purposes. Thus, according to the 1935 bill:
The Commission shall make a detailed report to Congress
of its findings of the facts of each claim, the conclusions
reached as to the merits of such claim and the reasons
therefor, together with an appropriate
recommendation for
2
action or nonaction by that body.
Congress was to be provided with a recommendation based on
an impartial study of a claim in order to determine whether or
not it should be heard in the Court of Claims. This was an improvement over the previous procedure in that the Department of the
Interior was no longer required to produce such an evaluation
and Congressional committees could make decisions on each claim
more quickly and reliably. Congress was not only to be supplied
with an evaluation of each claim, but the Commission was empowered to make specific recommendations suggesting that the claim
be dismissed, that Congress make an award without a court hearing
or that unanswered questions of law remained and that a jurisdictional act should be passed allowing the Court of Claims to hear
23. Among those who voiced such an opinion were President Harry Truman when he
signed the Act, Vance, The Congressional Mandate and the Indian Claims Commission, 45
N. D. L. REv. 325, 330 (1969); Congressmen on the Indian Committees, 79th Cong. Rec.
1356; and the Commission itself. I.C.C. ANN. REP. 1 (1969).
24. S. 2731, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1935); Hearings on S. 2731 Before the Senate
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1935)
[hereinafter referred to as
Hearings on 8. 2731].
25. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1970).
26. S. 2731, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1935) ; Hearings on 8. 2731 at 2.
27. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1970)
28. S. 2731, 74th Cong., 1st Sess, § 3 (1935) ; Hearings on S. 2731 at 2.
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the case. This again was an improvement in lightening the load
of the Court of Claims and in enabling Congress to pass jurisdictional acts appropriate to each claim, so that they could be disposed
of by the court without requiring Indians to return to Congress
for amendments.
In the Act, in contrast, the Commission replaced the Court of
Claims almost entirely. The Act provides that:
The Commission's report to Congress determining any claimant to be entitled to recover . . . shall have the effect of a
final judgment of the Court of Claims, and there is hereby
authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary
to pay the final determination of the Commission.
The payment of any claim . . . shall be a full discharge
of the United States of all claims and demands touching any
of the matters involved in the controversy.
(b) A final determination against the claimant... shall
forever bar any further claim or demand against the United
States arising out of the matter involved in the controversy.2
Thus Congress gave the Commission authority equivalent to that
of the Court of Claims, except that either party to the claim
could appeal the decision to the Court of Claims, "which Court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside"2 0
the Commission's final determination. The disputants were also
given the right of further appeal to the Supreme Court. Additionally
the Commission was encouraged to obtain instructions concerning
disputed questions of law from the Court of Claims."'
While giving the Commission broader jurisdiction by delegating
it the authority not only to replace Congress in judging the merit
of claims but to perform the work of the Court of Claims, Congress
also changed provisions dealing with the way the Commission was
to function. Essentially, the 1935 Commission was to be an investigatory body, but in the 1946 Act provisions were included allowing
the Commission to function as both an investigator and a court.
The 1935 bill states: "The Commission shall make a thorough search
for all evidence affecting such claims. . . ,,11 While both bills
provided that the commission have access to all government documents it might find necessary and that authorized personnel might
examine witnesses and take depositions,8 3 additional provisions are
29. 25 U.S.C. § 70u (1970).
30. 25 U.S.C. § 70s (1970).
31. Id.
32.
S. 2731, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7; Hearings on S. 2731 at 3.
33. S. 2731, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7; Hearings on S. 2731 at 3; 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 n,
70q (1970).
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made in the 1935 bill to facilitate investigatory activities. The proposed commission was enabled to employ:
such experts, field investigators, or professional and clerical
assistants as may be necessary to fulfill duties which cannot be properly performed by persons already engaged in
the Government service. At the Commission's request, the
General Accounting Office, the Land Office, and the Bureau
of Indian Affairs may transfer or temporarily assign to the
Commission such of their employees as are specifically qualified to assist the Commission in the performance of any of
its duties under the Act. 84
In the 1946 Act, however, investigatory functions were seen as
being performed by one part of the Commission, an Investigation
Division, rather than constituting the work of the Commission as
a whole. Thus Section 13 (b) of the Act says:
The Commission shall establish an Investigation Division to
investigate all claims referred to it by the Commission for
the purpose of discovering the facts relating thereto. The
division shall make a complete and thorough search for all
evidence to the Commission.By thus including provisions for both court and investigative
functions, Congress left ambiguities concerning the way the Commission was to function. It was left to the Commission to decide
within what kind of structure it would function as a court and
to what extent it would serve as an investigator. Congress gave
the Commission responsibility for making final decisions on claims
but did not state how the Commission was to arrive at these decisions. "The Commission shall have power to establish its own
rules of procedure."' 6 Debate on this issue, which was intermittently
carried on within the Commission and by others connected with
it and which has never been settled to the satisfaction of all participants, has been the result in part of the ambiguous character
of the Act.
IV
IMPLEMENTATION:

STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES

The fact that the Commission was to perform both adjudicative
and investigative functions and the delegation of authority to the
Commission to determine the structure within which these functions
34.
35.
36.

S. 2731, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9; Hearings on S. 2731 at 3.
25 U.S.C. § 701 (b) (1970).
25 U.S.C. § 70h (1970).
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would be carried out gave rise to disagreement over the way
in which the Commission was to function. The Commission has
functioned in such a way that its adjudicative responsibilities have
taken precedence. The problems which it has encountered in settling
claims and the inaccurate interpretation that Indian claims were
matters to be tried as in a typical court structure suggest that
an alternative structure would have been better. An alternative
would have improved the processing of -this particular type of
claim; it would have required viewing the purpose of the Commission more from the perspective of the claimant and less from
a legal, bureaucratic orientation.
Congress in creating the Act and the Commission in forming
its structure made little effort to consider the views of the Indians.
Those involved-Congress, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Department of Justice, the Commissioners and lawyers formerly involved in Indian litigation-were groups primarily concerned with
the instrumental rather than the ideological issues. As with the
preceding jurisdictional act process, claimants were free only to
accept or reject the Commission if they wanted to have their
claims heard. For those groups who reacted negatively to this
policy, cooperation with the Commission was more capitulation than
redress. 7 What is missing from the attitude of those who did
make the decisions about the Act and the Commission's structure
is an awareness of the fact that claims cases differ from typical
court cases in that in principle it has been acknowledged that
the claimants have legitimate grievances for which they are entitled
to redress. With such an orientation, decision makers would have
more easily been able to realize that what was necessary was
finding the facts of the cases-and thereby discovering those particular cases where the evidence did not support the claim-rather
than proving guilt or innocence. Developing a structure on the
basis of this orientation would have mitigated many of the problems
the Commission-as-court has encountered.
The history of Indian claims policy has been characterized
by indecisiveness over the question of structure. The earliest solution for dealing with Indian claims was to group them with all
other claims cases to be heard before tht Court of Claims. Bills
37. One such group was the Seminole Indians who were not interested in monetary
compensation for their historical grievances as offered by a white dominated government
and only reluctantly agreed to file a claim on the initiative of lawyers. Interview with
William Sturdevant, September 2, 1971. One group of Seminoles remained intransigent
and threatened to go to the United Nations with their grievance, wanting their land
back, not money, The issue was settled for the Commission by the Court of Claims on a
procedural issue such that claims were to be presented by officially designated representatives of the tribes and no separate group had a right to intervene, and could only present
testimony. Hearings for 1960 Before the Houee Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1086 (1959).
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before Congress in 1930, 1934 and 1935 to improve Indian claims
processing suggested a separate court which would deal exclusively
with Indian claims. As the dissatisfaction in Congress with the
process of passing jurisdictional acts was one of the important
reasons for the search for a new policy, and as it became clear
that the problem lay in the need to improve information gathering
prior to the passage of enabling legislation, and not in the congestion
in the Court of Claims, greater interest was given to establishing
a commission which would be attached in some way to Congress.
Thus, bills introduced in 1935, 1937, 1940, 1941, 1945 and 1946 called
for some form of a commission.3" In hearings on a 1935 bill, efforts
were made to stress that the proposed structure was "not a court," 8 9
but rather an "agency of Congress" 40 or a "legislative arm of
14
Congress. 1
This thinking led to a claims processing policy which can be
viewed in three phases; this is exemplified by S.2731 above. The
new commission would streamline the process of information gathering, and its jurisdiction would extend to making recommendations
to Congress on the basis of its investigations. Congress was the
focal point in the second phase of the decision making process.
It could finally dispose of claims, by rejecting them or granting
awards, or it could stipulate that a court hearing was necessary
to resolve all relevant issues. In such cases the required process
of litigation and finally decision-making would be delegated to the
Court of Claims, in the third phase. What is important to understand
here is that it was not seen as necessary to proper claims handling
that all claims receive a court hearing.
One aberration in this process of choosing an acceptable claims
policy came in 1945 in the form of H.R.1189 which proposed the
creation of "an independent agency of the executive branch of
the government, to be known as the Indian Claims Commission.
• . ., At the suggestion of Felix S. Cohen, then Associate Solicitor
for the Department of the Interior, and Ernest L. Wilkinsen, a lawyer
long associated with Indian claims cases, this definition of the
Commission was deleted because, along with appearing to "have
no legal significance," the phrase was "not entirely consistent with
the functions of" the Commission which, again, was to be an "agent
4

38. Vance, supra note 23, at 327-28 ; Hea ngs on H.?. 7837 at 23.
39. Hearings on H.R. 7837 at 7, 26.
40. Id. at 7, 12.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Hearings on H.i. 1198 and H.i. 1341 Before the House Commt. on Indian Affairs,
79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1945) (emphasis added).
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of the Congress"4 8 whose functions would be "partly legislative
and partly judicial, rather than executive."

44

This phased approach to claims settling was missing from the
policy set out in the Act as passed. Congress gave the Commission
jurisdiction to perform the functions in alll three of the above
phases, and it left to the Commission responsibility to determine
how this single body would carry out these functions. Thus in
instructing the Commission both to conduct investigations and to
hear claims cases Congress saw no inconsistency; both functions
had been considered necessary to claims settling as Congress had
viewed earlier bills. The difficulty resulted from the strong emphasis
given by the Commission to the court function. Since the Commission decided that its cases were already too adjudicated, the idea
of its performing investigations on these same cases seemed contradictory. The role of the Commission-as-investigator became ambiguous. The Commission went back to the model of the Court of
Claims in structuring itself, not being instructed to use the phased
approach seen in earlier bills and not considering that this might
not be the most appropriate precedent. This situation may largely
be attributed to the fact that in the immediate change from the
Court of Claims to the Commission as the locus of hearing Indian
claims, there was a large carry-over of personnel associated with
such cases, i.e., the lawyers for the plaintiffs and those from the
Department of Justice as defendant. These people were influential
in determing the Commission's structure and helped perpetuate
an adjudicative environment in the Commission.
The alternate phased approach was developed by Congressmen
in response to what was seen from their perspective as a solution
to their difficulties in claims processing. The Act did not communicate this approach to the Commissioners, who were given rein
to establish procedures as they saw appropriate. However, it did
include provisions for court hearings. Thus, though Congress had
earlier given preference to a commission format, a court structure
could and did result, and the Investigation Division became a residual element.
The Commission has minimized the operations of the Investigation Division, and the debate which has continued because of
dissatisfaction with the Commission's functioning primarily as a
court has centered around the use of this Division. The attitudes
about the Commission's proper structure have varied from that
of Commissioner Witt who explained, "It is called a commission.
43.
44.

Id. at 14,0.
Id. at 149.
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We are in reality a court. '4 5 Commissioner Vance concluded a
critique of the Commission's functioning by stating, "The Commission has chosen to sit as a court, and, as a result, the Congressional
4 6
mandate has been utterly frustrated.
In an early case, Pawnee Indians v. United States 4 7 the Court
of Claims on appeal interpreted Section 13 (b) of the Act and resolved
the concern felt by the Commission over whether it was statutorily
required to establish a continually operating Investigation Division.
The Court ruled that:
Section 13 (b) of the Act does not make mandatory the referral of every claim to the Division for investigation ....
It is within the discretion of the Commission to refer a claim
to it or not to do so. It is the primary duty of the parties
48
to gather the evidence and present it to the Commission.
The Investigation Division has continued to exist, because of
the statutory requirement, but its functions have been unimportant.
Originally the Commission set up the Division with a Chief Investigator and one lawyer as staff member. When the Chief left the
Commission he was not replaced and the Commission began to
designate the members of its legal staff as attorney-investigators.
The Division made minor reports on five early cases, but because
both litigants were preparing their court presentations by independently conducting wide ranging investigations on their cases, the
output of the Investigation Division was soon seen as unnecessary
and most investigatory activities were abandoned. Since then, the
Division has functioned in occasional circumstances. In some cases,
the tribal lawyer's contract expired, was not renewed and no replacement was found. In others, the tribes were unable to obtain
any legal counsel. Such situations usually arose with claims of
doubtful validity or minimal evidence which would not likely result
in an award. Because, however, these claims had been filed, the
45. Hearings for 1956 Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. 574 (1955).
46. Vance, supra note 24, at 335.
47. In this section I am relying heavily on an explanation of the Investigation Divivision's functions provided by the Chief Commissioner Watkins in response to a request
by James A. Haley, Chairman, Subcommittee on Indian Affairs for the House Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs prompted by a complaint by the plaintiff in the Indians
of California case raised at the time Congress was holding hearings prior to the awarding of judgment funds to the effect that at some point during the claims determining
process they had requested information from the Commission and did not receive It. Hearings on California Indians Judgment Fund, 1966, Before the House Committee on Interior

and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 190 (1966). Parenthetically, the section of
Watkins' letter which responds to this specific complaint states, "There Is little, If any,
demand from Indians or their counsel for information from our very limited Investigations. A few Indians have mentioned It to us recently, but when we have explained the
situation to them they seemed to be satisfied.' " Id. at 195.
48. Id. at 193, 194.
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Indians had the right to have them heard, and the Commission
had the Division function as investigator and counsel for the plaintiff. In another situation, similar to that which prompted the opinion
in the Pawnee case, if the Commission had reason to doubt that
all relevant evidence had been uncovered, it could either direct
the parties to research certain issues or, because "Congress assigned an unusual and broad function to the Commission with respect to its investigatory powers, ' ' 49 the Division could perform
the investigation, acting as "an amicus curiae.''5
Once established, the Commission's structure has been remarkably resistent to change. Procedures have been modified in response
to instrumental problems within the court format, as will be shown
in the following section, but no suggestion for over-all restructuring
has been seriously considered. Such suggestions have not been made
in terms of the phased approach mentioned above, which would
have brought both investigation and litigation meaningfully into
the Commission and would probably have offered the most successful alternative. Because of the polarization brought about by a
Commission functioning as a court, the issue unfortunately has
been viewed in terms of having either a court or an investigating
body.
One of the objections raised to the Commission's investigatory
powers is that the integrity of the lawyers for the plaintiff and
the defense would require that they not accept the results of investigations not conducted under their own auspices. Without doing their
own research, it is asserted, they could not know if investigations
have been adequate. Furthermore, the need for the parties to study
the conclusions of the Division's research would also prolong the
process; as Commissioner Arthur V. Watkins explained:
Our experience is that the parties would take exception to
whatever was reported unless it was in their favor. If they
didn't approve of the investigation reports they would undoubtedly move to strike them from the record. All of these
add another
items would be time consuming and could easily 51
five to ten years to the life of the Commission.
Thus, he concluded, "an investigation as envisioned in the Claims
Act would be very costly, impractical, time consuming, and in
5
many instances useless.1

49.
50.
51.
.52.

Id. at 193.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 195.
Id.
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These problems all reflect the attachment to the adjudication
of claims which has characterized the Commission in operation.
Had the process been looked on less unifunctionally, these problems
would not have been as serious. Claims have been viewed as cases
bringing together two disagreeing parties who by presenting their
sides of the dispute before an adjudicator, in this case the panel
of Commissioners, can have their conflict resolved. Had it been
accepted that claims-settling dealt rather with finding facts on
cases which in principle have been acknowledged as valid, it would
not have been necessary for both the Indian groups and the Department of Justice to conduct separate investigations. The immense
and costly task of bringing to light a body of largely historical
facts would then not have needed to be duplicated, but could have
been entrusted to the Commission as an impartial arbitrator. The
experts hired by the Commission for this purpose would be essentially the same people as have been used by the parties. Disputed points
and suspected inaccuracies in the Commission's findings could have
been subjected -to further research. The question of how the Indians
and the Department of Justice would know if the findings were
faulty without conducting their own studies is the same problem
the Commission has already successfully confronted, as mentioned
in connection with the Pawnee case. Since, however, Commissionconducted investigations would not be those of the "opposing party,"
there would be less reason to suspect the validity of the findings.
Over and above the facts of the cases, any points of law
to be determined could also be dealt within this framework. The
legal reference points upon which claims decisions have been based
are the decisions in earlier claims cases from the Court of Claims
and the guidelines in the Act. As shall be shown in the section
on Commission decisions, many of the decisions were without precedent and have resulted from the interpretations of the Act by
the Commissioners and the Court of Claims. This process would
remain unchanged were the Commission also to conduct investigations. The Department of Justice would continue to fulfill: its statutory
responsibility to defend the United States, 58 and counsel for the
Indians could protect the position of the tribes against objectionable
interpretations of fact or points of law by means of the statutorily
required hearings on each case before a final decision can be
made and the opportunity for appeal to the Court of Claims. These
safeguards would insure that a fair hearing of each case would
be brought about without using a court format.

53.

Id. 25 U.S.C. § "on (1970).
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It has been asserted by lawyers and others favoring the court
system that an adjudicative structure was the only one whereby
Indians could obtain their "day in court" and that they would not
trust a government-established commission to decide cases against
the government. The Commission, however, has been established
so as to be independent of the influence of other arms of government. The danger of pro-government bias would not change whatever the structure, and the present Commission has not been accused
of partiality. As an impartial legislative body, using primarily academic experts from outside government, the danger of Indians
not being given fair treatment would be remote. Hearings and
appeals would provide the opportunities for objecting to Commission
conclusions. Thus it would seem decisions satisfactory to Indians
would result from a structure which did not carry the implication
that no claim was seen as justified until the Indians had proved
it to be so.
The experience of the experts employed by the Indian claimants
and the Department of Justice who conducted investigations and
presented findings illustrates the difficulties which the court format
presented to settling Indian claims. One such expert has pointed out
that ' " [T] he Court of Claims had used anthropological testimony
on only three occasions and no precedents in testimony had been
established in this regard, so that the role of expert witness was
' 4
a new one for archaeologists, ethnologists and ethnohistorians.
The difficulties involved in the lengthy, intricate and at times conflicting presentations of evidence by experts were not anticipated
by the Commission when it modeled itself after the Court of Claims.
Likewise, most experts had no previous experience in working within
a legal setting. They felt it incumbent upon them to adjust to
the requirements made by the lawyers and the peculiarities of
court procedures. Had the settling of claims cases not taken place
within a court setting with two opposing parties, many of the
difficulties of the Commission in obtaining information about claims
would have been mitigated. Expert witnesses, testifying in the setting
of a hearing, especially when under cross-examination at times
55
by lawyers interested
approaching the character of "inquisition,''
in stressing their own side of the case, have tended to becloud
the issues by taking a defensive position. Had the Commission
directed information gathering and employed scholars to work together in their research, differences among the experts could have
54.

Lurle, The Indian Claims Commission,

311 ANNALS

OF THE AMERICAN

ACADEMY OF

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 60 (1957). [hereinafter referred to asthe I.C.C.A.].
55. Lurie, A Reply to the Land Claims Cases: Anthropologists in Conflict, 3 ETHNOHISTORY 268 (1956). [hereinafter referred to as REPLY].
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been ironed out before the presentation of conclusions to the Commission. Such an arrangement would also have enabled scholars
to freely present relevant information of a social and cultural nature,
without the constraints of working under the direction of lawyers.
It would have given those professionals who were most familiar
with this kind of information the responsibility for presenting it
to the Commission, rather than having lawyers incorporate types
of evidence with which they were unfamiliar into legal briefs.
Thus, experts and lawyers alike, have been inconvenienced
by the difficulties of working together under the structure of the
commission-as-court. Anthropologists have consciously attempted
to adapt and have held discussions and conferences and written
papers 6 focusing on issues such as protecting informants in presenting testimony, preserving relationships with tribes with which
they want to continue to work (especially those who have been
employed by the Department of Justice) and of the "problems
of communication between anthropology and the law. '

5

17

They have

also recognized, however, that the requirement to join opposing
camps was an unnecessary one for the critical element in claims
settling of information gathering and that it inhibited their ability
to present the facts. They have not expected to be influential
enough to effect a complete restructuring of the Commission but
have understood that their influence in the future should be applied
at the policy-formation stage.
A non-court structure would also have been preferred from
the perspective of the time the Commission would take to complete
its work, an issue which has been important to Congress since
before the Act was passed. In expressing the rationale for originally
allotting the Commission a ten-year life span-within which, given
the large number of cases facing the Commission it would not
have been able, under any format, to complete its work-Congressman Henry Jackson referred to other commissions, using examples
where a court structure had not been employed:
When we set up a Court of Private Land Claims in California
in 1851 we set a limit of 2 years on the presentation of the
Spanish and Mexican claims. We cleared up the situation
in that period of time and so far as I know we have not
reopened the question since. From time to time we have set
56. Three such conferences were the April, 1954, meeting of the American Ethnographical Society in New Haven, Conn.; the Indian Claims Symposium at the December,
1954, American Anthropological Association meeting in Detroit, Mich., papers from which
appear in 2:4 ETHNOHISTORY (1955) ; and the session on "Anthropology and Indian Land
Claims Litigation" of the May, 1955, meeting of the Central States Anthropological Association in Bloomington, Indiana.
87.
EPLY supra note 55, at 266.
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up other special temporary commissions on Indian claims
such as the Dawes Commission and the Pueblo Lands Board,
which were able to clear up within a few years problems
that had been troublesome for many decades. The decisions
of the Dawes Commission and the Pueblo Lands Board have
not been overthrown either by the courts or by later Congresses. I think that we can expect as much finality in the
work of this Indian Claims Commission provided we give it
a jurisdiction broad enough to deal with the entire problem
as it now exists and provided we require all Indian tribes
to present their claims within 5 years or forever hold their
peace.58
It was under the impetus of speeding up the Commission's work
that the attempt was made, aided by the influence of John Vance
on the Commission, to essentially re-structure the Commission by
putting the Investigation Division into operation. The issue was
brought before the Commission and described in hearings of the
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and was described
by Vance in an article and in a memorandum to the Commission
of October 28, 1969. 51 Vance has indicated that the currently operating Foreign Claims Settlement Commission provides a model of
a successful non-adjudicative commission dealing with similar issues
which it would have been wise for the Commission to use.6 0 These
efforts have resulted in procedural changes of a narrower scope,
as will be discussed below, but no changes were made in the,
functions of the Investigative Division.
By structuring itself as a court, the Commission has complicated
the procedure for settling claims, in a way which has not only
been inappropriate to the most effective presentation of information,
but has lengthened the life of the Commission. This has involved
58.
59.

Vance, supra note 24, at 330, quoting 92 CONG. REC. 5313 (1946).
These documents and others related to this discussion are found in Hearings on

Status of Indian Claims Litigation Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Af-

fairs, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970) (hereinafter referred to as Heaings on Indian Claims
ftigation). The recommendations, as given In Vance's article, are as follows:
1. Refer all claims before the Commission to the Investigations Division as authorized in section thirteen (b) of the Act.
2. Authorize the Director of the Investigations Division to utilize the services of
any employee of the Commission In making a complete and thorough search of the evidefne affecting the claims. The employee should be authorized to administer oaths and
examine witnesses as authorized in section eighteen of the Act.
3. Authorize the employment of an intermittent or regular basis of anthropologists, historians, ecologists, land appraisers, economists, accountants, investigators and
such other persons as shall be necessary to complete the investigations.
4. Direct the Investigations Division to submit to the Commission all pertinent evidence and proposed findings of fact upon which a Commission decision can be based.
5. If the Commission agrees that the proposed findings are proper then a hearing
should be called to give the interested parties an opportunity to be heard before the Com-

mission makes its final determination as authorized in section seventeen of the act.
Vance, supra note 24, at 335-36. A slightly amended version appears in Vance's October
28, 1969, memorandum.
60. Interview with Commissioner John T. Vance, September 3, 1971.

380

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

"a bewildering series of hearings on title, value, offsets, attorneys
fees and all the motions that any party chooses to present"8 1
and compliance to the requirements of time demanded by the
Indian and defense lawyers and their investigators.
Because of the momentum which the Commission had established in its then twenty three years of operation and of the preference by claimants that all cases be handled in the same manner,
the confusion which would have resulted from structural reorganization in 1969 might have further prolonged the Commission's life
and would have undermined some of the Commission's legitimacy.
The time has passed when it would have been possible to create
a Commission most appropriate to its purpose.
V
IMPLEMENTATION:

PROCEDURE

The early Commission, confronted with an unexpectedly large
work load in the number of claims filed and in the complexity
of the issues in deciding them, functioned slowly and rather inefficiently. It was criticized in Congress for not having made efforts
at procedural reform to correct this situation.6 2 In attempting to
organize its operations and bring together the elements of trial
proceedings and the requirements of preparing claims cases, the
Commission evolved a working procedure including trial in several
stages. Originally the Commission waited until all parts of a case
were prepared before holding trial. This was seen as unnecessarily
time-consuming and costly, especially for cases decided against
the plaintiff on a question considered early in the trial. Later
the several stage approach was adopted. It was facilitated by the
opportunity for interlocutory appeal to the Court of Claims provided
in 1960, which would not, however, prejudice the chance for later
appeal on a question decided early in the trial.6 ,
In the first, or title stage, the Indian claimants were to show
they were "successors in interest" to those wronged. Among
the issues here were defining which Indian group, in the hierarchy
of Indian organization, was the party to the claim,64 determining
whether or not this group actually had title to the land (an important issue to be dealt with below) and defining the contemporary
61. Vance, supra note 24, at 334.
62. Hearings on Indian Claims Commission Before the Subcomm. on the Dept. of Interior and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1403 (1963).
63. 25 U.S.C. § 70s (b) (1970).
64. A. Kroeber, Nature of the Land-Holding Group, 2 ETHNOHISTORy 303-12 (1955).
See also Lurie, Problems, Opportunities and Recommendations, 2:4 ETHNOHISTORY 372
(Fall, 1965) [hereinafter refered to as Problems].
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counterpart of the early group. The purpose of this stage was
to establish the group legally entitled to serve as plaintiff. The
question of what individuals were legally members of this group
was left for Congress to decide in its responsibility for authorizing
awards. In the value stage, used in land claims, the exact acreage
was determined and evalulated, and from the value of the land
taken the amount of compensation previously paid was subtracted,
to determine the liability of the United States. The third stage
involved the determination, with the help of reports by the General
Service Administration, of gratuitous expenditures made by the
government on behalf of the plaintiff. Such offsets as the Commission
found were to be charged against the tribe and deducted from
the amount owed. In cases where a dispute arose between the
plaintiff and its counsel, a fourth stage was required to determine
fees and expenses.
Within this procedural format, coordination of the participants
presented a problem that has frustrated all attempts at speeding
up the Commission's work. This is a problem related to the complex
nature of the adjudicative claims processing procedure which could
have been mitigated had a more simplified procedure, such as that
of an investigative commission, been used. This alternative would
also have put more of the participants directly under the authority
of the Commissioners and given them more power to influence
the pace of operations. The Indian claimants who set the Commission in motion by filing claims provided no problem of coordination
or delay, being influenced by the pressure of a specific deadline.
Since sixty-two per cent of the claims were filed within six weeks
of that date, the Department of Justice was deluged with a large
number of claims for which it had to prepare answers. The inadequate staff of the Land and Natural Resources Division of the
Justice Department, charged with the defense of Indian claims,
has been cited as the main reason for the delay the Department
caused in the early period of the Commission's existence.6 5 Thus,
in 1958, Commissioner Witt stated:
There are a hundred or more claims that have been pending
before us, some of them 5 years-they cannot be pending
less time than that, some of them have been pending longerthat the Department of Justice has not even as yet been able
to make sufficient investigation to file an answer and set
65. Among the statements to this effect are those of Commissioner Witt in 1965.
Hearings for 1957 Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 631
(1956); Hearings for 1958 Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 85th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 15 (1960).
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up the defenses that it might have to the payment of the
66
claim.
Once the bulk of this work had been completed, the Commission
found itself waiting for the Indian lawyers to prepare their full
presentations. Thus in more recent times the plaintiff has been
cited as the cause of delay. 67 The Commission has also been cited
as a cause of delay because of the time it has sometimes required
to hand down decisions.6s In various appropriations requests the
Commission has asked for funds to hire additional lawyers, and
in 1967 the number of Commissioners was increased from three
to five, partly to enable the Commission to process its work load
more rapidly. 69
One final reason for delay concerns claims which require a
full accounting by the government of its handling of tribal funds.
The General Accounting Office and, after 1965, the Indian Tribal
Claims Branch of the General Service Administration have had
the responsibility for making such accountings, and recently the
inability to complete these cases has been attributed to the slowness
of the G.S.A. Little can be done by the Commission in trying accounting cases before these reports are completed, and it is perhaps
a measure of the work completed on land and other cases that
recent concern has focused on this particular set of claims. Congress and the parties to the affected claims cited this problem
in hearings held in 1970. The Commission was less concerned,
it seems, because it was out of phase. A decision that the accountings
be made up to the date of the trial, rather than up to 1946 when
claims filing began, settled by appeal to the Supreme Court in
the case of Southern Ute Tribe v. United States, has made the
work load of the G.S.A. greater and more difficult. Accountings
of recent transactions require obtaining records scattered throughout. regional federal records offices and Bureau of Indian Affairs
field offices. These records are not available with the older records
in the Washington archives. 71 The G.S.A. staff working on claims
66. Hearings for 1958 Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 730-34 (1957).
67. Examples are found in Hearings on the Indian Claims Commission Act: Extension
and Enlargement Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior

and Insular Affairs 90th Cong., lst Sess., 108 (1967)

[hereinafter referred to as Hearings

on I.C.C.A.]

68. Some such criticism was made during the 1967 hearings to extend the Act by Indian lawyers, Id. at 97,99; and by Senator Ed Edmundson Id. at 110.
69.
70.

25 U.S.C. § 70b (a)
(1970).
Hearings on Indian Claims Litigation Before the House Comm. on Interior and

Insular Affairs. 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 25 (1970,)
Wilkinson). Response by Commission Chairman

(statement by tribal attorney Glen A.
Jerome K. Klykendall indicating the

Commission and the Court of Claims decisions would be made shortly. Id.

at 27.

71. Id. at 54 (statement by Dr. James B. Rhodes, Archivist of the United States, General Services Administration).
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accountings has been allowed to dwindle from about eighty or
ninety to two persons. 2 Enlarging this staff would help eliminate
one of the current reasons for lack of coordination which delays
the Commission's work.
The Commission has been criticized for failing to take the
initiative of conducting investigations itself.
Conforming to existing procedures, the Commission sat entirely as a judicial body performing no independent investigation of the claims filed before it but instead waiting for
the claimants' attorneys and the lawyers of the Department
of Justice
to present the issues and the evidence to the Com78
mission.
Barker, while suggesting only changes aimed at accelerating the
Commission's established procedures, asserted the Commission
"should exercise aggressive leadership in requiring counsel to get
cases prepared, heard and concluded.' 74 Some changes have been
brought about by a Commission more aggressive and pressured
to finish its work.
The orientation toward procedural reform began in the early
sixties and has continued to be important to the Commission. This
impetus was spurred by Congressional dissatisfaction with the long
life of the Commission, and its concern that the Commission may
attempt to perpetuate itself. Thus, for instance, in 1961 it was recommended that ". . . Congress ascertain the reasons for the inordinate
delay of the Indian Claims Commission in finishing its important
assignment. ' ' 75 In 1967 Congressman John P. Saylor expanded on
this issue in Committee hearings:
I certainly believe that this committee and our counterpart on the other side of the Capitol should be advised every
year so we can ride herd on this Commission, so to speak,
to see to it that they do their work and go out of business
at the end of this period of time. rA bill to extend the Commission's life to 1972 was being discussed.] In other words,
they have been in existence twice as long as they were sup72.

Statements of staff size var.-:

Chief Commissioner Watkins gave the f!gure eighty

In 1961 and 1963. Hearings for 1962 Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 87st
Cong., 1st Sess. 887 (1962); Hearings for 1963 Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1410 (1963). Franklin Ducheneaux, Legislative Consultant to
the National Congress of American Indians gave the ninety and two figures. Statement
of the Witness of the National Congress of American Indians on S. 2408, a bill 'to Ew'tend the life of the Indian Claims Commission, and for Other Purposes' before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the United States Senate enclosed in a letter
from Leo W. Vocu, Executive Director, N.C.A.I., October 26, 1971, at 3.
73. Vance, supra note 24, at 333.
74. Barker, The Indian Claims Commission-The Conscience of the Nation tn its Dealings with the Original Americans, 20 FED. B.J. 240, 245 (1960).
75. American Indian Chicago Conference, The V'oice of the American Indian-Declaration to Indian Purpose,University of Chicago, June, 1961, at 15.
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posed to have been originally, and while these cases are
complicated, it seems to me that the
Congress has been more
76
than patient with the Commission.
Reflecting its own concern with this problem, the Commission in
a 1968 statement to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
asserted that "it 'will institute any innovations which will expedite
its work'.""7
Under Chief Commissioner Arthur V. Watkins, the Commission
in 1960 began to maintain a calendar of hearings, whereby the
parties agree in advance on a specific date for the presentation
of their cases. While this has undoubtedly encouraged lawyers to
prepare their cases more rapidly, requests for continuances have
limited the effectiveness of this reform in accelerating claims processing.7 8 The provision Congress added to the Act in 1967 requiring
that a calendar be set up including a trial date earlier than December 31, 1970, for each claim and including strictures against continuances has added weight to this Commission policy.7 9
In 1968, as one of the changes Commission Chairman John T.
Vance was able to make to expedite procedures, the Commission
issued a policy statement on pretrial procedures. This included
preliminary conferences which, unlike trial proceedings which at
the time required a quorum of three Commissioners, were conducted by only a single Commissioner. Pretrial proceedings have reduced
the number of issues to be dealt with at the trial hearings by
producing stipulations on agreed facts.80 The conferences have been
favored by experts as an alternate to an investigatory Commission
and have aided them in presenting their special types of evidence.8 '
They have helped in eliminating differences which were "more
apparent than real and were due to the nature of questions put
to them in a litigious situation ' 8 2 or to different theoretical perspectives.
Settling cases by compromise is another way to expedite the
Commission's work. Some early cases were settled by compromise
under rules established for the Court of Claims, but this method
was replaced in 1960 by new procedures aimed at making such
decisions more compatible with the Commission's aim of finally
disposing of Indian claims. The key charge was to require that
76.
77.

Hearings on I.O.C.A. supra note 67, at 108.
Vance, supra note 24, at 335.
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Sess., pt. 2, at 10 (1965) ; Hearings on I.C.A.A., supra note 67, at 11, 32, 52-53, 68.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1970).
80. United States Indian Clain-9 Commission, Policy Statement § 101: Pretrial Instructions to Counsel, mimeo. July 15, 1968.
81. LuRrE, REPLY, supra note 55, at 268, 275.
82. THE I.O.C.A., supra note 54, at 60,
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compromises receive the approval of the Indian groups involved
before they could be finally considered by the Commission. This
provision was intended to eliminate the chance that Indian claimants
would file suits against the government based on dissatisfaction
with the compromises agreed to by their lawyers. 8 This attempt
to improve compromise decisions reflects the Commission's view
of compromises as a satisfactory, if not preferred, way of settling
claims. Compromise decisions can shorten the trial process by
eliminating the need for hearings on at least some phases,8 although the value in this is reduced because they usually can be
agreed upon only near the end of the trial proceedings, 5 and
are made without recourse to lengthy appeals. Congress as well
has favored compromise decisions as a means of successfully disposing of claims, shown in their addition of Section 27(b) to the
Act. The new section provided that if a claim was not ready
by its calendar date, with allowance for a maximum of one year
of continuances, it was to be dismissed with prejudice unless a
compromise was being negotiated,8 6 no matter what the reasons
for delay or the appropriateness of such a settlement.
The question of why Indian claimants should accept a compromise amount, through compromise procedures which often benefit the lawyers and the Commission more than the Indians, has
only been answered by the statement that a full hearing might
produce a settlement less than that reached by compromise.8 7 Indians, it is said, might get just about as much money nevertheless.
The faster settlement would provide awards which could begin
to draw interest earlier, if investment is possible given the method
of disbursement chosen.
This rationalization of the use of compromise becomes more
acceptable if the Indians do approve the settlement. In regular
proceedings Indian claimants can appeal a decision, even by replacing their lawyer if he should disagree (assuming that the B.I.A.,
which must approve all lawyers before they can work on claims
cases, does not object). Compromises, however, are intended to
produce agreements which, because they are agreed upon in advance by all parties, do not require appeal. In some instances
it has been seen that Indians have not been given adequate opportunity to consider and respond to proposed settlements.
83. Hearings on I.C.C.A., supra note 67, at 50, 138; Barker, The Indian Claims CornMfssiof--The Conscience of the Nation in its Dealings with the Original Americans, 20
FED. B.J. 240, 244 (1960).
84. Hearings on I.C.A.A., supra note 67, at 51; Hearings on Indian Claims Litigation
at 43.
85. I.C.C. ANN. REP. at 5 (1969) ; I.C.C. ANN. REP. at 3 (19701).
86. This amendment was added in 1967. 25 U.S.C. § 70(w) (Supp. III, 1964).
87. Hearings on Indian Claims Litigation at 38.
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In the case of the Winnebago Indians, 9 the haste and pressure
of the lawyer in getting tribal approval, even though "his intentions were doubtlessly honorable," produced a rapid and positive
vote on the proposed compromise partly because the Indians were
given the impression that this would enable them to receive the
award faster than if they voted after thirty or sixty days of deliberation. Indians who might have voted against the compromise had
the feeling that a positive result was inevitable even though they
did not understand or had misgivings over the compromise, not
to mention grievances which they felt had never been considered
by the Commission.
A second case is Indians of California v. United States, one
of the biggest cases considered by the Commission, involving an
"identifiable group" of Indians created for the purpose of claims
litigation through the consolidation of those of the approximately
five hundred California bands and tribelets that had filed claims. 89
This claim involved about seventy per cent of the land of the
State of California. The compromise in this claim was described
as "a real test of the compromise program." 90 According to expert
testimony, without it the case would have taken another fifteen
years to conclude. 9' Though success in concluding such a case
may be seen as quite an accomplishment, the dissatisfaction expressed by some of the parties over the outcome reflects failure
to fulfill the objective stressed as critical if a compromise program
is to produce final claims settlements. When the Indians were
asked to judge the compromise, some of them were dissatisfied
with the agreement and with the procedures employed to obtain
their vote to the extent of demonstrating to prevent the compromise
from being finalized. 92 This description of how the vote was obtained
reflects the view of the dissenting Indians and their reasons for
seeing no benefit from working through the Commission in trying
to resolve their differences:
The Commission made a formal decision to submit a settlement to the claimant, Pitt River Indians of California [one
component of the "Indians of California"] in a meeting of
the tribe at Altruas [California]. The Bureau of Indian
Affairs prepared a list of tribal members and sent out notifications. The meeting rejected the settlement. Thereafter,
88. Information for this example was provided by a letter and enclosures from Nancy
Oestrelch Lurie to John T. Vance, Commissioner, of August 1, 1969, given this author by
Commissioner Vance.
89. Hearings on I.C.C.A., supra note 67, at 51. These figures are attributed to anthropologist A. L. Kroeber.
90. Id. at 63.
91. Id. at 51.
92. Id. at 63, 51.
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admittedly upon the urging of the attorney for the Pitt River
Indians, the Commission changed its decision in order to provide for a mail ballot for those who had not voted at the
meeting. Incidentally, the proposition submitted by mail was
different from the proposition submitted at the meeting, and
the mail ballots were sent to 100 or more people than were
on the list to be invited to the meeting. The Bureau then
announced that the total ballot narrowly approved the settlement. 93
In requiring Indian lawyers to solicit the opinion of the Indians
on the proposed agreement, the Commission was placing the Indians
in a more important position than they had held at any other
point in the claims determining procedure. Throughout most of
the procedure, they held a role secondary to that of their lawyers
and the legal framework of which they were a part, which was
more or less foreign to them. They were called upon to give
evidence and provide a token presence at hearings, and hopefully,
they had some leverage in deciding strategy and goals. In this one
step, however, the Indians were able to express their opinion, even
to the extent of vetoing the result of all litigation on their claim.
In this light, the dissatisfaction expressed may be indicative of
a more widespread attitude held by Indian claimants which has
no opportunity to surface. The opposition of lawyers to obtaining
tribal approval, the haste and anxiety over getting the necessary
votes and the supportive efforts of the B.I.A. and of the Commission
in these efforts, in turn, may all reflect a concern that this procedure not be allowed to open upon the gap separating the primarily
white, legal-bureaucratic framework within which claims adjudication-as well as virtually all Indian-government relations--occurs,
from the Indian viewpoint. The government pattern as shown in
claims policy relegates Indian participation to passive acceptance
of these bureaucratic requirements if they are to obtain any redress.
Perhaps it can be said that the Indians have compromised all
along and that when given an opportunity to express their opinion
over a specific issue, their negative vote reflects at least in part
an opinion over much broader issues, such as the way in which
claims are settled, the types of claims which are not taken into
account and the nature and amount of awards.
VI
IMPLEMENTATION:

USE OF SECTION 2 OF THE ACT

Section 2 of the Act contains a comprehensive listing of the
93. Cassandra Dunn and Aubrey Grossman For the Legal Staff, Letter to Fellow
Lawyers, August 3, 1970. Enclosure in letter from Sara Greenfelder, infra note 109.
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types of claims to be filed. The five clauses in this listing are
not in the form of mutually exclusive categories intended to limit
the types of claims filed. Rather, they were designated as guides
for the filing of claims on the basis of any and all Indian grievances, with the one proviso that they were to apply only to groups,
not individuals. Section 2 states:
The Commission shall hear and determine . . . (1) claims
in law or equity arising under the Constitution, laws, treaties
of the United States, and Executive orders of the President;
(2) all other claims in law or equity, including those sounding in tort, with respect to which the claimant would have
been entitled to sue in a court of the United States if the
United States was subject to suit; (3) claims which would
result if the treaties, contracts, and agreements between the
claimant and the United States were revised on the ground
of fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration, mutual or
unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact, or any other
ground cognizable by a court of equity; (4) claims arising
from the taking by the United States, whether as the result
of a treaty of cessation or otherwise, of lands owned or occupied by the claimant without the payment for such lands
of compensation agreed to by the claimant; and (5) claims
based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity. 94
Clauses 1 and 2 cover typical claims cases in law or equity,
based on the Constitution, laws, treaties or executive orders or
sounding in tort. Clause 2 is a specific application of principles
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, also passed in 1946, eliminating
the United States' immunity from suits in tort. 95 Clauses 3 to
5 provided the Commission with jurisdiction beyond that allowed
in a regular claims court. In clause 3, Congress gave the Commission authority to perform the political function of going behind
a treaty, necessary in hearing any case where provisions of the
treaty itself formed the basis of the claim. Clause 4 acknowledges
government liability in transactions involving land held by so-called
"Indian title" or "aboriginal title," which had never been specifically
recognized by Congress. In writing the fifth clause, Congress created
a new cause of action, assessed as the most unique feature of the
Act, appearing to be an "unprecedented jurisdiction for any court." 96
This clause confers broad jurisdiction on the Commission to hear
cases which arise from moral wrongs. Although some cases dealt
94. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1970).
95. Selander, Section 2 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 15 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
388, 403 (1947).
96.
fBarney, Some Legal Problems Under the Indian Claims Commission Act, 20 F)ED.
B.J. 235, 238 (1960).
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with under clauses 3 and 4 could also be argued on the basis
of "fair and honorable dealing," the particular purpose of this
clause was to give claims with no other basis an opportunity to
be heard.
In assessing the claims actually filed under these provisions
it will be seen that a narrow range of claims formed the large
bulk of those filed. The clause 5 provisions were narrowly construed
and thus the full potential of the Act was not realized. There
is no statistical analysis of the six hundred and five dockets in
terms of causes of action, which would have enabled a more specific
statement about the use of Section 2. Thus a non-quantitative
breakdown based on descriptions in the literature concerning claims
filed will be presented here.
The great majority of claims filed involved disputes about land;
the close association of the Commission with land cases has even
led to its being erroneously referred to as the Indian Land Claims
.Commission.97 Disputes typically involved the issue of whether inadequate compensation or no compensation was paid when Indian
groups ceded territory to the government or were forcibly removed.
Such cases could fall under clause 4 when no formal government
recognition of the Indians' claim to the land had been given by
Congress. When a treaty recognized the cession of land, claims
would be filed under clause 3 if the terms of the treaty were
viewed as unjust or under clause 1 if they had never been carried
out by the government.
Among other claims made were those involving the failure
of the government to fulfill other treaty obligations, such as the
agreement to provide reservation schools, annuity payments or
equipment.98 Another group dealt with claims in tort and commonly
required the government to account for its management of the
tribal funds which it held because of its fiduciary relationship
to the Indians. These last two categories of claims, however, were
often filed merely as adjuncts to the land claims which formed
the main focus of the cases.
Particularly in regard to clause 5, "the spirit of the law," 99
it is clear that the provisions of Section 2 were not used to their
full potential. John Collier, former Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
described the reason for this final clause:
A considerable number of claims and grievances do not grow
out of the legal facts but essentially out of the moral parts
97. Lurie, Problems, supra note 64, at 372.
98. Hearings on H.R. 1198 and H.R. 4341 Before the House Committee on Indian Affairs at 96.
99. Lurie, Problems, supra note 67, &t 371.
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of the record. There are a great many valid claims, valid
humanely and morally, but such as have no basis in law. 10
Some of these valid claims which this provision might have been
used to support but which were not filed are given in the following:
Any ethnologist can think of dozens of examples of losses
not recognized by any rule of law or equity. . . . [These
include claims] of broken cultures, of grievances against
the government not for loss of property in economic terms
but the loss of a way of life, of social and psychological
inadequacy which resulted from fair, honorable and even
any of
benign motives on the part of the Government. ....
these claims would require peculiar interpretations in the
attempt to gain restitution, 01
and clause 5 was to give such claims the opportunity to receive
a hearing.
In considering the reasons for this small number of types of
claims, it is to be noted at the outset that the Commission itself
had no role in claims filing, aside from assuring that all Indian
groups were informed of the five year deadline, 10 2 a function it
has never been accused of being derelict in performing. 0 8 Certain
categories of claims were not filed because of clear legal restrictions. Claims involving grievances where a state government had
jurisdiction, including those resulting from dealings between tribes
and the colonies, were not acceptable. This explains why relatively
few claims involving land along the eastern seabord were filed.
Secondly, claims arising after 1946 were not to be accepted. The
Act, however, did provide that such claims would come under
Court of Claims jurisdiction, eliminating entirely the need for jurisdictional acts. 10 4 Some post-1946 claims, however, such as those
for Alaska and for water rights in the Southwest, involve important
issues of government policy and have been dealt with by Congress
and the executive branch.
The most important reason for the limited variety in the claims
filed was related to the nature of compensation to be awarded
and to the novel character of parts of Section 2. Although nowhere
in the Act is it explicitly stated that recoveries were to be monetary,
the wording of the Act indicated that this was the legislative intent.
100. Hearings on 7837 supra note 8, at 6.
101. Lurie, Problems, supra note 67, at 372.
102. 25 U.S.C. § 70k (1970).
103. One exception to this concerns native groups in Alaska who have asserted they
were never informed of their rights. It appears, however, that, if true, the claims of
those groups date later than 1946 and would not fall under Commission jurisdiction and
that, furthermore, Alaskan claims are being dealt with by a special non-Commission procedure. 90th Cong., Hearingson LC.A.A., supra note 67, at 20-21.
104. Indian Claims Commission Act of August 13, 1946, ch. 959, § 24, 60 Stat. 1049, 1055.
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Section 19 reads, "The final determination of the Commission ...
shall include . . . a statement (a) whether there are any just
grounds for relief of the claimant and, if so, the amount thereof
.....

and Section 22 states ".

.

. there is hereby authorized

to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to pay the final
determination of the Commission."'

105

In filing claims for "highly

tangible losses such as land, or matters regarding payment for
such land and administration of material needs of Indians once
placed under government supervision," ' 10 6 there was a continuity between pre-Commission procedures using the Court of Claims and
operations under the Commission. Innovations in Section 2 were
not widely used, particularly if they called for the risks of using
new causes of action to file complicated claims based largely on
intangible losses for which there were no precedents to indicate
how assessments might be made and thus how large recoveries
would be. Lawyers who were instrumental in preparing claims
for filing thus concentrated with the tribes on those claims with
the greatest previously indicated potential for large monetary returns. One suggestion has been made which might have been used
to alleviate some of the difficulties in filing such novel claims
to the effect:
. . . that bothersome phrase 'fair and honorable dealings'
. . . indicates a social awareness on the part of legislators

but lack of social scientific facts to develop constructive
legal measures for the alleviation of gnawing bitterness on
the part of Indians and satisfaction of the sense of national
obligation that led to the enactment of the Indian Claims
Commission.
• . . had the wording of the Act been less emotionally
weighted in terms of fair and honorable dealings and concerned instead with ethnological concepts of cultural integrity
and functional expediency, it would permit objective presentation of facts on such matters and be no more far-fetched
than such established legal precedent of claims based on
'mental anguish' or 'loss of companionship'. . . 107
105. U.S.C. § 70u (1970).
106. Vance, supra note 24, at 372.
107. Lurie, Problems, supra note 64, at 373. On implication of the dissatisfaction felt
by social scientists raised over the wording of Section 2(5) and which, hopefully, can be
avoided in the future as scholars concerned with Indian affairs gain more experience and
influence in dealing in a legal context and with government officials is that such scholars
should participate more actively in the formation of legislation concerning Indians. Lurie
recognizes this when she writes the Act "stands as a warning that the [ethnological]
profession in the future ought not leave such matters almost exclusively in the hands of
lobbyists and legislators of commendable intent, but with little social scientific training."
Id. at 365. This is an opinion shared by Steward, "Theory and Applications in a Social
Science," 2:4 ErTNOHISTORy 292-302 (1955). This absence of participation by academic
experts is noted also by Gary Orfield in his study of the termination policy. As he writes:
[t~he massive record of testimony on the termination bills is perhaps most
surprising for what it fails to contain. In more than 1,700 pages of testimony
there is no statement by a sociologist, an anthropologist, a social worker, or
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One of the important areas of dissatisfaction with the Commission from the Indian perspective concerns the provision that awards
be monetary. Claims typically arose from the taking of Indian
land by the government to facilitate the westward movement of
the white population across the continent. Given the strong attachment to land which has remained one of the persistent characteristics
of Indian societies, just compensation would involve return of at
least some of the land which was taken, not a monetary substitute.
The importance of land to the Indians has been widely documented,
and the following quotation from the "Declaration of Indian Purpose" produced by the 1961 American Indian Chicago Conference is
representative of this attitude.
When our lands are taken for a declared public purpose,
scattering our people and .threatening our continued existence,
it grieves us to be told that a money payment is the equivalent of all the things we surrender. Our forefathers could be
generous when all the continent was theirs. They could cast
away whole empires for a handful of trinkets for their children. But in our day, each remaining acre is a promise that
we will still be here tomorrow. Were we paid a thousand
times the market value of our lost holdings, still the payment
would not suffice. Money never mothered the Indian people,
as the land has mothered them, nor have any people become
more closely attached to the land, religiously and tradition-.
ally. 10 8
anyone else trained In the social sciences. Although most reservations have
been studied by social scientists concerned with Indian acculturation, the
only evidence presented to the committee was a letter from an economics
student who had spent a summer on one reservation.
Orfield, supra note 18, at 11-12. Further study by Orfield has shown this to be an overstatement, but the point It makes remain valid.
Vine Deloria's angry chapter 'Anthropologists and Other Friends" In CUSTER Dim
FOR YOUR SINS (1969) makes the same point in a more guarded fashion. Cynical and bitter about the harm anthropological studies have had on Indian communities and in governmental policy formation, he acknowledges that social scientists have the real needs
and work to provide them. In his impassioned discussion of the termination policy, which
could be applied to claims and other policies as well, he writes:
Compilation of useless knowledge [by anthropologists] 'for knowledge's sake'
should be utterly rejected by the Indian people. We should not be objects
of observation for those who do nothing to help us. During the crucial days
of 1954, when the Senate was pushing for termination of all Indian rights,
not one single scholar, anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or economist
carne forward to support the tribes against the detrimental policy. [This
overstatement relied on Orfield's original findings.]
How much had scholars learned about Indians from 1492 to 1954 that
would have placed termination in a more rational light? Why didn't the
academic community march to the side of the tribes? Certainly the last few
years have shown how much influence the academic can exert when it feels
impelled to enlist in a course. Is Vietnazn any more crucial to the moral
sense of America than the great debt owed to the Indian tribes?
108. American Indian Chicago Conference, The Voice of the American Indian-Declaration of Indian Purpose, University of Chicago, June, 1961, at 16. [Hereafter referred to
as "Declaration. Other statements making the same point are found in Lurie, Problems,
supra note 64, at 372; U. STEWART, THE QUIET CRISIS 4-7 (1963) ; EGGAN, FRED, PROCE.DINGS OF THE
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United States

Commission on Civil Rights, Justice: Report, at 116 (1961); and in a statement by anthropologists Stanley Diamond, William H. Fenton and William C. Sturdevant in U.S.,
Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Kinzua Dam Seneca Indian
Relocation. 8th Cong., 1st Seas., 1963, serial no. 6, p. 505.
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A comment signifying a similar Indian opinion directed to the
work of the Commission comes from the Committee of Concern
for the Traditional Indian.
We [the Committee] are interested in it [the Commission]
inasmuch as it has been one of the vehicles employed by
the federal government to disinherit Indian people from their
land. It has also been useful in that it has determined that
lands were unjustly taken from the Indians, but to then turn
around and tack a price on that land and give the original
inhabitants a choice of accepting the money or not (not a
choice of money or land) is unjust in itself. 10 9
In a few cases claimants chose to make an issue of their
desire for land, rejecting the Commission's settlement. One such
case involves the Pitt River Indian component of the Indians of
California claim, who have decided to refuse payment of their
portion of the award and demand return of their land. It is uncertain
whether any court "has jurisdiction to put the Indians back in
possession of their land" since "the title of the United States cannot
be litigated except by the Indian Claims Commission."
Most lawyers can be expected to 'be practical' and smile
at the idea that the Courts would return land to the Indians.
They may be right that, despite pious phrases, there is no
real intention on the part of the legal system and the courts
to end the 'heritage of centuries of injustice' (Nixon) or to
offer the protection of the Constitution to 'the American Indians who have been oppressed and brutalized and deprived
of their ancestral lands'. (Nixon) We choose instead the position of Judge David Bazelon of the United States Court of
Appeals that 'moral arguments backed by the hard facts
of discrimination and deprivation
are still the most important
1
force . . in the court room'. 1"
The most famous of such cases is that of the Taos Pueblo
who were actually awarded a portion of their ancestral lands,
formerly a part of a national forest preserve, which was of religious
significance. The return of the Blue Lake shrine and some surrounding land was the result of initiative taken by the federal executive branch of the government which, through extensive lobbying
of the Senate, was able to obtain the necessary legislation over
the objection of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee."'
109. Letter from Greensfelder to the Committee of Concern for the Traditional Indian,
September 19, 1971.
110. Cassandra Dunn and Aubrey Grossman For the Legal Staff, letter to Fellow Lawyers, August 3, 1970, enclosure in letter from Sara Greensfelder, supra note 109.
111. Interview with member of President Nixon's staff, September 12, 1971.
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This effort by President Nixon was much publicized as an example
of the administration's benevolence and new thinking on Indian
affairs. However, they strongly denied it being a precedent for
the awarding of land, describing it as merely an act in respect
1 12
of Indians' religious beliefs.
A final type of claims which was not considered by the Commission is that which resulted from the government's policy of allotment, 118 which was a misguided attempt to make Indians into small
farmers on the model of white Americans by allotting plots of
land to individual Indians, who would receive title after a period
of years. Any remaining reservation land was sold. This policy
was, as termination, repudiated by the government but not until
after it had resulted in disastrous losses, largely at the hands
of land hungry whites who were successful in obtaining the Indians'
land, often fraudulently and at prices much below market value.
These claims were not heard because they would have been filed by
individual Indians, which was beyond the jurisdiction of the Act.
The government has left unsettled this type of legitimate grievance.
Given the gap between the limitation placed on the nature
of awards to be made by the Commission and that which would
have been more satisfactory to the Indians, it is to be hoped
that in the future the government will evaluate its need for removing Indians from their lands on the basis of the history of Indianwhite land dealings, the cultural importance of the land to the
Indians and the requirements of economic viability of tribal units,
as well as of government needs and the availability of alternate
means to satisfy those needs. The decision on the Alaskan natives
claims case, unusual in the size of the award in land and in
the inclusion of royalties for mineral resources, gives some cause
for hope; but this case was aided by an equally unusual amount
of hard fighting, organization, expense and public concern from
publicity and has not been everywhere lauded as a real victory
for the Indians." 4 The taking in 1964 of 10,000 acres of Seneca
land by the Army Corps of Engineers for the Kinzua Dam, though
$3 million was paid, was a loss to the Senecas because the value
15
The
of their land to them could not be measured in money.
Tuscaroras in New York were paid $850,000 for five hundred fifty112. Id. Nixon's speech, 116 CONG. REC. 23131.
113. Lurie, The Body From Boston and the Omaha Indians, 3 THE AMERICAN WEST
31-33, 80-84 (1966).
114. One statement showing the danger to the way of life to some Alaskan natives as
a result of the pipeline which would be built on their land Is, Frank, Richard, "An
Alaskan's View of His Land," in 3:9 AKWESASNE NOTEs 5 (1971) excerpted from, Not
Man Apart, a FRiENDS OF THE EARTH PUBLICATION, November, (1971).
115. The Angry American Indian: Starting Down the Protest Trail, TIME, Feb. 9, 1970,
at 14, 18.
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three acres in the late 1950's for a dam, while Niagara University
16
Such examples reflect
received $5 million for two hundred acres.
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such relations with Indians, the government,
reorient its viewpoint so as to prevent the development of new
grievances.

VII
COMMISSION DECISIONS
The first category of decisions to be considered deals with
the question which arose early in the Commission's life of whether
claims would be accepted if no formal government recognition
had ever been made of the Indians' title to the land claimed.
This question was answered in the case of Otoe and Missouria Tribe
of Indians v. United States,1 17 where the Court of Claims ruled
in favor of claims based on unrecognized aboriginal or Indian title.
Because of the large number of claims where no recognized title
or treaty existed to substantiate the claimants' original right, without this decision the Commission would have been forced to exclude
many claims which were legitimate. Many tribes had never been
involved in government relations which left a record of official
recognition that they held land. As a result of this decision, to
establish the title of their ancestors to the land, claimants must
either produce some evidence of government recognition or of their
long term exclusive occupation of the land.
In the category of land claims questioning the amount of compensation paid, the formula which has evolved is narrow and ad hoc.
Generally, in those cases where land was taken without compensation, whether or not the taking was agreed to, the right of the
claimant to recover is clear; but in cases where the full price was
never paid or where the agreed selling price is claimed to have
been too low, the issue of whether the consideration paid is "unconscionable"" 8 must be decided. The difference between the fair market
' 9
value and the amount paid must be "very gross" 1 or so large as
116. Id.
117. Otoe and Missouria Tribe of Indians v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265 (Ct. C1.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955).
118. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (3) (1970).
119. Osage Nation of Indians v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. C1. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951).
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to "shock the conscience,' 1 20 in order to be found unconscionable.1 222'
In particular cases it has been held that a fifty per cent disparity
or a payment of only sixty-five per cent of the minimum value
of the land1 23 was a very gross difference. To impose such a requirement is entirely inconsistent with the intent of the policy to compensate all proved claims.
In an attempt to eliminate this ambiguity, the Commission tried
to have Congress amend the Act, changing "unconscionable" to
"inadequate, ' ' 124 but such an amendment was never passed. Such
a change would also have removed this restrictive interpretation
of "unconscionable" and made it possible to make awards for any
disparity between the actual and fair prices. As a result, in adherence to the Act, the Commission feels it must deal with questions
of payment in terms of an ill - but restrictively-defined moral basis
rather than on a more straightforward consideration of equity. This
has increased the number of appeals to the Court of Claims, which
has found grounds, in a number of such cases at least, to reverse
the Commission's decision.
The Court of Claims has made it abundantly clear that it
apparently favors, as a matter of simple justice, payment
to Indian tribes in all cases where the consideration paid to
said tribes for their land does not measure up to the then
fair market value. As a strict matter of equity and not taking
into consideration the strict terms of the Act with respect to
'unconscionable' consideration, the Commission cannot find
s
fault with that position. 2
Despite the Commission's strict construction of the Act, decisions
on this issue can be made with the realization that the conscience
of the Court of Claims is somewhat easily shocked. Given the
Act's wording, however, it must be realized that in order for claimants to receive any payment for their losses, they must somehow
prove an unconscionable disparity, and once proved, they are subject
to being compensated fully, not just to the level considered "conscionable." Tribes can thus be barred from receiving an award
simply because they unfortunately were paid some small amount
for their land at the time of taking.
120. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 229 (1956).
121. Osage Nation of Indians v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl. 1951), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1953). Lummi Tribe of Indians v. United States, 181 Ct. CI. 753
(1967).
122. Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 281 F.2d 202 (Ct. C1. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1960).
123. Lummi Tribe of Indians v. United States, 181 Ct. C1. 753 (1967).
124. Hearings on I.C.C.A., supra note 67, at 53-56, 69.
125. Id. at 55.
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Once it was accepted that the claimants were entitled to additional payment for their land, further decisions were made to arrive
at the amount of that compensation. The general formula evolved
for these awards viewed just compensation as the true market value
at the time of taking, less compensation previously paid and the
value of any offsets which might be deducted. In determining how
much land was to be included with Indian holdings, the Commission
early established a precedent favoring a more liberal interpretation
of land use than that proposed by the Department of Justice. It
decided 126 against the ecological theory newly developed by experts
working for the Department whereby land use was calculated on
the basis of the area needed to supply daily needs. The Commission
preferred the older theory which considered land use in terms
of a way of life and acknowledged that some land claimed by
127
Indians was used less intensively.
In regard to the payment of interest on unpaid compensation
for land, the Commission adopted the general pattern of United
States courts. Unless there existed a specific legal agreement requiring interest or unless the taking occurred in violation of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, no interest was to be paid.
In determining the value of the land, appraisers, who functioned
as experts in this phase of the cases and who were faced with the
difficult task of valuing large tracts as of a century or more
ago, were instructed to incorporate as many factors as possible into
their calculations. Thus they considered location, natural resources
such as timber, minerals and water, and the value of similar
adjacent land on the open market. As these valuations were all
made as of the time of taking, however, no compensation was given
for the future profit which could have been made by the Indians
from the land or its resources, whether from agriculture, proximity
to markets, timberland or rich gold, silver or other mineral resources, which in some cases motivated the removal of the Indians
128
in the first place.
In claims regarding government responsibility to provide necessities of life, and the equipment necessary for making a living such
as educational and health facilities, the Commission has relied
on government obligations to each tribe as stipulated in treaties
or other formal agreements and an unsystematic consideration of
the kind of relationship which existed between government and
tribe, such as whether it was technically one of guardian and ward.
126. Decisions 8 IND. CL. COMM. 1, 31-36 (July 31, 1959).
127. Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 926 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
128. Examples of this are the Sioux and the California Indians who underwent wholesale displacement In the gold rush and received no compensation for the gold. See, e.g.,
Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 229 (Ct. C1. 1956).
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Thus two tribes who had been similarly treated would be differently
compensated by the Commission depending on whether certain formalized arrangements-now, as then, of much less importance to
the Indians than to the government-guided the government's action.
It was within the limits of Section 2, particularly if clause 5 had
been viewed broadly, for the Commission to have looked more
often to the moral and equitable rather than legal considerations
and to have considered compensating all Indians on the basis of
the way they were dealt with, not primarily on the basis of the
existence of non-existence of formalized agreements.
One of the considerations influencing the amount of compensation paid was the question of how much the Commission was going
to cost the government. During the discussions preceding passage
of the Act and in its early history, concern was voiced over this
issue, particularly by Congressmen and the Department of Justice.
One Congressman was worried that from the number of claims
which would be filed, a tremendous amount of monetary compensation would be requested. He concluded that a commission which
was being delegated such great power, more than a court because
of its ability to decide moral questions, should be closely supervised
by Congress.

129

Such supervision did not occur until much later, motivated by
concern about the amount of time the Commission was taking to
complete its work, not about excessive awards, which was a problem
that never materialized. One further incident occurred, early in
the Commission's life, before anxiety about the cost of the Commission was finally laid aside. When it was decided that land claims
based on Indian title were to be eligible for compensation, the
Department of Justice estimated that there was a potential recovery
of over three billion dollars. In response to these figures, the Commission replied that as of 1957 awards amounted to about one
per cent of the amounts claimed, and thus there was no cause
for alarm on the basis of the Department of Justice's estimate. 30
The reasons for such a large differential remain to be evaluated
in full, but one factor was the exaggerated amounts claimed, partly
as a tactic to make the recoveries as large as possible and partly
because those filing claims before a Commission which had never
issued a decision had no way of knowing on what basis compensation
would be calculated. Other reasons are the efforts of the defense
in limiting recoveries and the amounts deducted from the awards
129. Hearings on Indian Claims Commission Act, H.R?. 4497, Before the Senate Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess, 62-63 (June 1, 12; July 13, 1946) (Statement
by Sen. Chambers).
130. Hearings for 1957 Before the House Comm. on Appropriations; 84th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 632-33 (1953).
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as offsets. The argument that award monies would result in less
federal spending for Indians has not proven to be the case. 131
In general, then, it would seem that the decision to consider claims
based on Indian title and the decision to evaluate land as of the
time of the taking were complementary and effected a necessary
compromise without which the Commission would be ineffective
and economically infeasible.
The Act 88 gives the Commission broad discretionary authority
to determine what offsets may be charged against a claim, beyond
the limits of well-defined categories of expenditures which are statutorily defined. The Act permits the Commission, if it wishes, to
assess all acceptable gratuitous expenditures made for the tribe
and offset some or all of these if it decides that the "nature
of the claim and the entire course of dealings and accounts between
the United States and the claimant in good conscience warrants
such action. . .184 The situation regarding offsets is analogous
to that of "unconscionable consideration," in that the decisions
in both depend on a moral judgment. They are reflective of the
Commission's concern for equity. Thus in a recent decision the
Commission attemnted to stipulate that offsets would only be allowed
when they exceeded five per cent of the award. This rule was
rejected by the Court of Claims on the basis that it amounted
to unauthorized payment of interest, 13 and it was stated that offsets
79TH CONPREss. supra note 11, at 1154.
The part of the Act concerning offsets, found in Section 2, is as follows:
In determtnln a the quantum of relief the Commission shall make anpropriate deductions for all payments made by the United States on the
claim, and for all other offsets, counterclaims, and demands that would be
allowable In a suit brought In the Court of Claims under section 145 of the
Judicial Code (16 Stat. 1136; 28 U.S.C. see. 250), as amended; the Commission may also Inquire Into and consider all money or property given to
or funds expended gratuitously for the benefit of the claimant and if it finds
that the nature of the claim and the entire course of dealings and accounts
between the United States and the claimant In good conscience warrants
such action, may set off all or part of such expenditures against any award
made to the claimant, except that It is hereby declared to be the policy of
Congress that monies spent for the removal of the claimant from one place
to another at the request of the United States, or for agency or other administrative, educational, health or highway purposes, or for expenditures
made prior to the date of the law, treaty, or Executive Order under which
the claim arose, or for expenditures made pursuant to the Act of June 18,
1914, (48 Stat. 984), save expenditures made under section 5 of that Act, or
for expenditures under any emergency appropriations of allotment made
subsequent to March 4, 1933, and generally applicable throughout the United
States for relief in stricken agricultural areas, relief from distress caused
by unemployment and conditions resulting therefrom, the prosecution of
public work and public projects for the relief of unemployment or to Increase employment, and for work relief (including the Civil Works Program) shall not be a proper offset against any award.
Indian Claims Commission Act of Aug. 13, 1946, 60 Stat. 1949, 1050.
133. 25 U.SC. § 70a (1964).
134. United States v. Delaware Tribe of Indians, 427 F.2d 1218, 1221 (Ct. Cl. 1970),
citinag 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1964).
135. United States v. Delaware Tribe of Indians, 427 F.2d 1218 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
131.
132.
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must be determined on an item-by-item and case-by-case basis.18 6
The Commission had
...

admitted that this case-by-case, item-by-item review by

as uncertain a compass as is furnished by the statute has
led to results that, if not inconsistent, at best furnish little
13 7
predictive value from the Commission's offset precedents.

Had such a formula been used it would have assured equal treatment of all claims, which the Commission likely attempts to provide
nevertheless. This, however, begs the larger question of why any
such offsets should be charged, simply because a tribe has chosen
to avail itself of the opportunity to obtain redress for its grievances,
particularly in view of the degree to which certain particularly
intangible components of these grievances have largely not been
assessed. Meriam expressed a similar attitude in 1928 in stating:
It is difficult to see why a particular group of Indians who
have been treated with injustice by the government should
have deductions made for gratuities already given them,
when other Indians who have suffered no wrongs are permitted to keep their gratuities in full. " 8
The use made of the final class of claims given in Section 2
(".

..

claims based on fair and honorable dealings that are not

recognized by any existing rule of law or equity") should also
be considered. Because the majority of claims filed were based
on land, they were pleaded under other clauses in Section 2. Usually
some reference was made as well to clause 5, as it was broader
and it was felt that claims too weak to be won on the basis
of the more stringent requirements of those other clauses could
be successfully argued as involving an absence of "fair and honorable dealings." The Commission has held that if a claim could be
tried under law or equity, clause 5 was not usable, 89 even though
it was acknowledged that some claims have a basis under both
clause 5 and another clause.' 40 It has been held that if a claim

fails under the other clauses, it will then be considered on the
basis of the "fair and honorable dealings" provision of clause 5.14,
136. Id.
137. Decisions, 21 I". C. COMm. 23.
138. L. M.EsrAm, Tnn PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 807 ('928).
139. Blackfeet & Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 161, 167-68 (Ct. CI.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 83 (1954) ; Osage Nation of Indians v. United States, 131
F. Supp. 265 (Ct. C1. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951).
140. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Tribes of Indians, 163
F. Supp. 603 (Ct. Cl. 1958), reconsideration denied, 166 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. CI. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 934(1958).
141. Osage Nation of Indians v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951) ; Otoe and Missouri Tribe of Indians v. United States, 131 F.
Supp. 265 (Ct. C1. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955).

NoTEs
Clause 5 thus becomes secondary to the others, to be used as a last
resort. Because of the relatively small number and the diversity
of cases tried under clause 5, little can be said in regard to
guidelines which might have been established as a basis for such
decisions. It has been indicated in a negative way that a moral
case could be proven only after a very thorough and careful consideration not only of what was actually done, but also of that
which was not done and of the motives and circumstances surrounding and underlying the overt acts of the parties and their intentions. 142
Thus, for example, it was asserted in one case that even though
there was technically no guardian-ward relationship between the
government and a tribe, the relationship involved special responsibilities by the government. Clause 5 was thus infrenquently and
very cautiously used and did not produce awards for the claimants
based on considerations of the moral issues of which they were
well' aware and which the Act intended to be considered.
The guidelines which the Commission wanted to establish regarding "unconscionable consideration" and offsets seem to reflect
an interest by the Commission in facilitating the claims settling
process by deciding certain recurring issues. These efforts, as well
as those dealing with aboriginal title and the interpretation of
land use, reflect a liberal interpretation of undefined issues in
the Act in favor of the claimants, an orientation which likely influenced the objections of the Department of Justice. In a larger sense,
however, the Commission's failure to question the charging of offsets
per se, its willingness to calculate awards on the basis of loss
of land alone and its failure to make Section 2, clause 5 an important
and broadly interpreted basis for awards reflect limits beyond which
the Commission did not venture in attempting to activate fully
the potential of this claims policy to redress grievances.
VIII
CONCLUSION
Creating a policy aimed at compensating for their losses was
a laudable if long overdue effort. In formally recognizing that
there were grievances to be settled, in providing a forum for
their hearing and in awarding some compensation the claims policy
was beneficial to many Indian groups and has in general had
a positive impact on Indian-government relations.
Just redress was seen as compensation for past wrongs which
had to be proven through court proceedings. Grievances were seen
142.
Gila River Pima-Maricopa
(Ct. C1. 1956).

Indian

Community

v.

United States,

140 F. SupP.
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primarily in terms only of the tangible losses which they involved,
based mainly on the default of legal obligations or on considerations
of equity among claimants. Compensation was in money, a fine
which the government could pay with facility. This view of just
redress was derivitive rather than causative, in that in the creation
and implementation of this policy concerns of efficiency were more
important than a conscious orientation toward providing the most
just compensation. The way just redress came to be defined was the
result of the attitudes of the decision-makers who were most influential in determining how the Commission was to function. The
tension in regard to the proper functioning of the Commission
was caused by individuals and groups who held a different view
of just redress and attempted to change the Commission.
Among the inadequacies in this concept of just redress was
that of monetary awards, seen as incommensurable with the nature
of the claims. The idea that money could be substituted for land,
not to consider the related grievances, did not accord with the
meaning of the losses to the claimants. It would have been more
appropriate, though difficult and innovative, to have considered
the types of compensation-land among them-which would have
eliminated rather than made payments against the grievances. In
this light it might have been productive to view the causes for
the claims as. in part the result of the way Indian-government
relationships were conducted in the past and to view compensation
with regard to current relationships as participated in by the descendants of both parties. Just redress would then have been viewed as
an attempt to re-orient contemporary relations so as to change
patterns which continue to produce grievances among Indians.
Government policy making, in general and regarding the Commission as well, has typically been carried out by government
departments attempting to decide what would be successful ways
of dealing with the issues at hand. Much of the frustration in
Indian-government relations has resulted from the government's
inability to establish effective policies on its own, recognized by
Indians and government alike as stemming at least in part from
the absence of Indians and Indian points of view and preferences.
The Commission, for example, emerges as a legal-bureautically
oriented structure more concerned with accomplishing its task than
ensuring that all just claims receive a hearing and appropriate
compensation. No one understands this characterization more clearly
nor is less surprised by it than the Indian claimants. For them
this policy presents no new departure from former policies created
in a bifurcated atmosphere where primarily white bureaucrats attempted to deal with Indian issues without consulting those who
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both know more about the problems and were to be bound by
the resultant policies.
Insofar as government has attempted to re-orient its approach
to Indian policy-making to include Indian participation, it has been
frustrated by the strength of the entrenched departments and ideas;
but it can only be said that efforts at making such changes will
produce at minimum fewer failures in creating Indian policy and
less aggravation and disappointment to Indians-whose government
is in principle committed to their betterment but continually misses
the mark. Policy making with Indian participation may ultimately
be the only way problems of Indian administration can successfully
be solved. The question of 'how Indian opinion-which cannot be
seen as unified any more than that of other minority groups in
this country-should be represented is one which would have to
be carefully considered if participation by Indians were seriously
intended to bring about improved policy-making. The existence today
of a growing number of Indians who are educated and able to function in a white man's government while committed to representing
the values of their Indian culture would hopefully lessen the difficulty
of the transition to an Indian-white partnership or even Indian
dominated Indian affairs bureaucracy.
In terms of just redress, then, it can only hypothetically be
asserted that had Indian participation in relation to the Commission
existed in ways other than their being required to prove what
had already been accepted in principle, Indian satisfaction that
their claims had been heard and that they 'had received just compensation would have been greater. While accepting the important
work that the Commission has done in dealing with one of the
long unsolved problems of Indian-government relations, such an
atmosphere would have made it more possible to say that the
Commission had successfully accomplished the purpose for which
it was created.
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